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Regular
colloquia are Wednesdays, 2:00pm - 4:00pm, at 280 Park Hall, North
Campus and are open to the public. Refreshments will be served.
Click here for a list of all Cognitive Science related events. This
page is periodically updated.
January
February
7 Kenneth
Forbus,
Ph.D., (forbus@nwu.edu)
Dept.
of Computer Science,
Northwestern University
"Qualitative Physics as a Language for Cognitive Modeling"
Introduction by Stuart Shapiro, Dept. of Computer
Science and Engineering,
UB.
14
Carl Alphonce, Ph.D., (alphonce@cse.buffalo.edu)
Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering,
UB
"Computational Implementations of Theories"
21
David Smith, Ph.D. (
psysmith@acsu.buffalo.edu)
Dept. of Psychology, UB
"Journey
to the Center of the Category"
28
Student
Poster Session
Poster
Session Pictures
March
7
Spring Recess
14
Donald Stuss, Ph.D., stuss@psych.utoronto.ca
Rotman Research Institute,
Toronto, Canada
"Attentional Functioning: The Roles of the Frontal Lobes"
21
Amanda
Woodward, Ph.D.,
alw1@ccp.uchicago.edu
Center
for Early Childhood Research ,
University of Chicago
"How
Infants Make Sense of Intentional Action"
28
Daeyol
Lee, Ph.D.,
dlee@cvs.rochester.edu
Center
for Visual Science, University
of Rochester
"Neural Mechanisms for Learning Sequential Movements"
April
4
David
Mark, Ph.D. (dmark@geog.buffalo.edu)
Dept. of Geography, UB
and
Barry Smith, Ph.D. (phismith@buffalo.edu)
Dept. of Philosophy, UB
Geographic Objects and Their Categories"
10
Distinguished
Speaker Lecture, Screening Room, Center for the Arts,
3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
Terrence
Deacon,
Ph.D.,(twdeacon@aol.com),
Dept.
of Anthropology,
Boston
University
"Human
Brains: The Difference That Makes The Difference"
11
Terrence Deacon, Ph.D.
Dept. of Anthropology, Boston University
"De-symbolization and Language Processing:
A Non-Innate, unlearned
Origin for UG?"
18
Ellen
Prince,
Ph.D, ellen@central.cis.upenn.edu
Dept.
of Linguistics, University
of Pennsylvania
"On
Identifying the Topic and Why We Might Want To Do So"
25
Business Meeting
Abstracts
Wednesday,
January 24, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Barry Smith, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy
University at Buffalo
"The
Windowing of Attention in Pictures"
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Wednesday,
January 31, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Jean-Pierre
Koenig, Ph.D.
Department of Linguistics
University at Buffalo
"What's
"in" a Word?"
Recent work on
the lexicon has stressed how much the syntactic context in which a
word occurs is determined by its meaning and that words pattern into
word classes on the basis of their meaning. This research suggests
that if you know the meaning of a word, you can predict to a large
measure the kind of sentences it occurs in. Taking this result as
a point of departure, the first part of this talk will discuss how
we can use the fact that lexical meaning determines syntactic context
of occurrence to infer the structure of the semantic information encoded
in words. In particular, my own research suggests that the semantic
information included in verbs has two parts, a relational component
(which covers notions like possesion, causality, having a mental representation...)
and a modal component (which covers notions like negation, necessity,
and time).
In the second
part of this talk, I will investigate an unanswered question of
the recent research on the relationship between syntax and semantics,
namely how we can determine the semantic information included
in lexical entries. I will hypothesize that two criteria affect
the inclusion of participant information in lexical entries: (1)
Whether participant information is obligatory and (2) Whether participant
information is specific to a restricted set of verbs. I will present
the result of several experiments which draw on a comprehensive
survey of the English verbal lexicon.
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Wednesday,
February 7, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Kenneth Forbus, Ph.D.
Department of Computer Science
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL
"Qualitative Physics as a Language
for Cognitive Modeling"
Most research
in qualitative reasoning has been driven by applications in engineering,
education, and other areas. However, I believe that perhaps the
most important role for qualitative physics is providing representations
and reasoning techniques for cognitive modeling. This talk will
examine ideas from qualitative physics in this light, including
speculations on how they can be used for modeling developmental
results, as a component in natural language semantics, and as a
bridge between perceptual and conceptual representations.
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Wednesday,
February 14, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Carl
Alphonce, Ph.D.
Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, UB
"Computational
Implementations of Theories"
Theories
of human cognition and human cognitive performance are typically
complex, reflective no doubt of the complexity of the underlying
system and processes which they seek to model. It can be difficult
at times to grasp the consequences of such a theory by manual inspection.
Implementing the theory can prove helpful. I will explore selected
issues related to the computational implementation of theories,
drawing examples especially from natural language syntax and sentence
processing.
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Wednesday,
February 21, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
David Smith, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Department of Music
Center for Cognitive Science
University at Buffalo
"Journey
to the Center of the Category"
Knowlton and Squire
showed that amnesics perform relatively normally when categorizing
dot patterns derived from an underlying prototype. But they are impaired
in performing an old/new recognition task with similar materials.
Knowlton and Squire concluded that categorization performance relies
on an implicit memory system--intact in amnesics--that represents
category-level information in the form of prototypes. They concluded
that recognition performance relies on an explicit memory system--impaired
in amnesia--that contains declarative memories about specific exemplars.
This dissociation in amnesia between categorization and recognition
seems to challenge a unitary exemplar theory that assumes a single
exemplar-based processing system. Responding to this challenge, Nosofsky
and Zaki (1998) derived new formal models of categorization and recognition
that were intended to explain the amnesia data using only exemplar-based
processing.
Our theoretical
analysis of Knowlton and Squire's data, and of Nosofsky and Zaki's
reinterpretation of them, suggests these conclusions. 1) Comparing
to-be-categorized items to a category center or prototype produces
strong prototype advantages and steep typicality gradients, whereas
comparing to-be-categorized items to the training exemplars that
surround the prototype produces weak prototype advantages and flat
typicality gradients. 2) Participants (including amnesics) show
the former pattern, suggesting their use of prototypes. 3) Exemplar
models account poorly for these categorization data, but prototype
models account well for them. 4) The recognition data suggest that
controls use an exemplar-memorization process more powerfully than
amnesics. By pairing categorization based in prototypes with recognition
based in memorized exemplars, we support the idea of multiple systems
or processes underlying categorization and recognition, we extend
other recent accounts of cognitive performance that intermix prototypes
and exemplars, and we reinforce traditional interpretations of the
categorization-recognition dissociation in amnesia.
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Wednesday,
February 28, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
- Sayaka Abe,
Department of Linguistics
Perception
of Rhythm in a Musical Phrase
- Eva M. Bero,
Department of Communicative Disorders and Sciences
Spectral Feature Processing: auditory transfer functions
for sinusoidal ripple
- Bert Capella,
Visiting Student, Department of Linguistics
Participant
Roles and the Role of Particles
- Hythem Ishmail,
Department of Computer Science & Engineering
The
Fleeting Now: Reasoning about the Passage of Time
- Francis
Johnson, Department of Computer Science & Engineering
Revising
Beliefs in an Implemented KRR System
- Kazu Kawachi,
Department of Linguistics
Practice
effects in speech production planning models
- Nathan Large,
Department of Psychology
The
role of short-term memory in language perception
- Frank Lehouillier,
Department of Linguistics
Asymmetric
logic
- Midori Minami,
Department of Anthropology
Self-recognition
and address forms among family members
- Luis Paris,
Department of Linguistics
Grammatical
encoding of the Event and Temporal structure distinction
- Chris Phipps,
Department of Linguistics
The
semantics of prepositions with English barrier verbs
- John Santore,
Department of Computer Science & Engineering
Identifying
perceptually indistinguishable objects
- Aniket Saoji,
Department of Communicative Disorders and Sciences
Auditory
masking patterns for simple spectral stimuli
- Bharat Sukhija,
Department of Computer Science & Engineering
Do
Birds Fly?
- Liza Zimack,
Department of Psychology
Talker
voice and similarity affect of lexical neighborhoods
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Wednesday,
March 14, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Donald Stuss, Ph.D.
Rotman Research Institute
Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care
Toronto, Canada
"Attentional Functioning:
The Roles of the Frontal Lobes"
The functions
of the frontal lobes have been difficult to differentiate. Terms
such as supervisory system and executive control have been used.
Recently, the fractionation of frontal lobe functions has been demonstrated.
In this presentation, a model of the functions of the frontal lobes
in attention will be presented, based on a modified version of the
Supervisory Attentional System of Shallice. Various attentional
tasks assessing hypothesized frontal lobe attentional functions
were presented to patients with lesions in various regions of the
frontal lobes as well as to patients with non-frontal lesions. These
tasks include the Stroop, feature integration decision reaction
time tasks, and a "select-what, respond-where" paradigm.
The results indicate that the anterior attentional system is a complex
interaction of distinct attentional processes, related to different
regions of the frontal lobes, and integrated with posterior brain
regions.
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Wednesday,
March 21, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Amanda Woodward, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Center for Early Childhood Research
University of Chicago
How Infants Make Sense of Intentional Action
The ability to make sense of the actions of other
people is critical to human functioning, and the origins of this
ability have inspired much speculation and debate. Until recently,
there has been little empirical evidence available to inform our
understandings this ability in infants. My collaborators and I have
begun to address this gap by asking whether infants make sense of
human behavior in ways that are continuous with later concepts of
intentional action. Adults have a strong propensity to construe
behavior as goal-directed. Mature reasoners represent action sequences
in terms of the actor's probable goals, weighting goal-related information
more heavily in memory than aspects of the events that were not
relevant to the actor's goals. With this in mind, we began by assessing
infants' encoding of a simple goal-directed action. Babies saw a
person reach through a distinctive path in order to grasp one of
two toys. This event was repeated until infants had habituated to
it. Then, the positions of the toys were reversed, and infant saw
test events in which either the path of motion or the goal object
of the actor's reach had changed. Six- and 9-month-old infants showed
a greater novelty response to the latter events than to the former.
Infants at both ages who saw an inanimate object reach toward and
grasp or touch the toy did not show this pattern. That is, infants
selectively encoded the relation between a human actor and the object
she grasped, and do not do this for inanimate graspers. Thus, there
is one way in which infant reasoning is continuous with mature reasoning.
Subsequent
findings revealed an interesting set of limitations to infants'
ability to interpret actions as goal-directed: (1) Infants do not
encode all events in which a person touches an object as goal-directed;
(2) Infants' encoding of action changes as their knowledge about
specific actions changes; and, (3) Infants' encoding of other people's
actions is related to their own experience as actors. These findings
indicate that infants' initial conceptions of goal-directed action
are grounded in their knowledge about specific acts, rather than
being the product of innate abstract conceptions of intentional
action. In a final study, we explored one route for infants' moving
beyond these early, specific notions of goal-directed action. Mature
reasoners are not limited to seeing a canonical set of actions as
goal-directed. Rather, we can freely interpret action in context,
drawing on our knowledge about actors and situations. We found that
in one very simple context, 12-month-old infants were similarly
able to use the behavioral and physical context of a novel action
to interpret it as goal-directed.
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Wednesday,
March 28, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Daeyeol
Lee, Ph.D.
Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Center for Visual Science
University of Rochester
"Neural
Mechanisms for Learning
Sequential Movements"
People
often achieve their behavioral goals by various movement sequences.
In most cases, these movement sequences are learned and through
training, their speed and accuracy improve. I will present some
of the results from our behavioral studies showing that different
dimensions of movement sequences (e.g., temporal vs. spatial) are
not learned independently, but rather acquired as an integrated
unit. I will then describe the results from our single-cell recording
studies in non-human primates. We recorded the activity of neurons
in the supplemetary motor area and the primary motor cortex using
a multi-electrode recording system, while the animals were performing
a serial reaction time task. The results indicate that majority
of neurons in both areas display changes in their activity during
the course of sequence learning, suggesting that information about
movement sequence is distributed in multiple brain areas.
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Wednesday,
March 21, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
David
Mark, Ph.D.
Department of Geography, UB
and
Barry
Smith, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy, UB
"Geographic
Objects and Their Categories"
This
colloquium will report the results of a series of experiments designed
to establish how non-expert subjects conceptualize geospatial phenomena.
Subjects were asked to give examples of geographic categories in
response to a series of differently phrased elicitations. The results
yield an ontology of geographic categories--a catalogue of the prime
geospatial concepts and categories shared in common by human subjects
independently of their exposure to scientific geography. When combined
with nouns such as feature and object, the adjective
geographic elicited almost exclusively elements of the physical
environment of geographic scale or size, such as mountain, lake,
and river. The phrase things that could be portrayed on a map
, on the other hand, produced many geographic scale artifacts (roads,
cities, etc.) and fiat objects (states, countries, etc.), as well
as some physical feature types. These data reveal considerable mismatch
as between the meanings assigned to the terms 'geography' and 'geographic'
by scientific geographers and by ordinary subjects, so that scientific
geographers are not in fact studying geographic phenomena as such
phenomena are conceptualized by naive subjects. The data suggest,
rather, a special role in determining the subject-matter of scientific
geography for the concept of what can be portrayed on a map.
This work has implications for work on usability and interoperability
in geographic information science, and it throws light also on subtle
and hitherto unexplored ways in which ontological terms such as
'object', 'entity', and 'feature' interact with geographic concepts.
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Wednesday,
April 18, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm
280 Park Hall
North Campus
Ellen Prince,
Ph.D.
Department of Linguistics
University of Pennsylvania
On Identifying the Topic and
Why We Might Want To Do So
Topics'
are usually defined in structural terms, typically the leftmost
NP in a clause (Halliday 1967; Gundel 1974, 1885...; Reinhart
1981; Foley and Van Valin 1984...). However, topics so defined are
clearly of no use in research attempting to correlate linguistic
form and cognitive function, given that the cognitive notion 'topic'
is in fact defined by linguistic form. In contrast, Centering Theory,
a computationally tractable means of modeling local attention
in discourse provides us with an algorithm for identifying
what I believe we intuitively think of as 'topic', without defining
it on the basis of its form. In this presentation, I shall
show how this works and shall cite some (perhaps surprising) research
findings on the relationship between topic thus defined and
the syntactic forms known as Subject-Prodrop, 'Topicalization',
and Left-Dislocation.
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